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Student evaluations of teaching: emerging surveillance and resistance 
 
Abstract 
Despite previous research claiming surveillance emerges from student evaluations of teaching 
(SET), there is an absence of research using surveillance theory to determine whether it 
emerges, the nature of the surveillance should it emerge, and how academics resist its effects. 
Through an analysis of four university business schools, a top-down vertical surveillance 
imbued with disciplinary procedures is identified, involving a few managers scrutinising 
many academics through the observations of many students. A bottom-up vertical 
surveillance is also identified, involving many academics scrutinising a few managers 
through the observations of many students. The similarities and differences between mystery 
shopping and the surveillance emerging from SET are also explored to highlight the crucial 
role students play in the surveillance. A further contribution is made through an analysis of 
how academics engage in resistance activities designed to disrupt the flow of performance 
information between observer and observed. 
 
Introduction 
Student evaluations of teaching (SET) have become an established performance management 
tool for universities to measure and evaluate student satisfaction with teaching (Blackmore 
2009; Bedggood and Donovan 2012). The seemingly objective nature of these performance 
management tools has persuaded universities that SET can provide managers with auditable 
performance information to assess whether academics achieve teaching expectations 
(Bedggood and Donovan 2012). SET have several potential benefits: providing management 
with insight that can be used to validate a new programme; providing management with 
information about academic performance; providing students with a source of information to 
aid their choice of where to study (Collini 2012); providing students with a voice to express 
their satisfaction with teaching; and providing academics with feedback to improve their 
teaching (Johnson 2000). Despite the potential benefits, it has been suggested that academics 
experience SET as a form of surveillance. 
Workplace surveillance refers to management’s ability to observe, record, and track 
employee performance, behaviour, and personal characteristics (Ball 2010), appealing to 
moral criteria relating to direction, proscription, and control (Lyon 2006). Existing research 
suggests that surveillance emerges from SET, yet these studies do not draw on surveillance 
theory to determine whether it emerges or the nature of the surveillance should it emerge. It 
has been claimed, for example, that SET enact a form of surveillance that creates feelings of 
anger and fear amongst academics whilst also damaging working relationships (Blackmore 
2009; Johnson 2000). Ogbonna and Harris (2004) suggest that management increasingly use 
SET as a surveillance mechanism that drives ‘student-focused’ emotional labour. This creates 
pressures for academics to conform to student feedback, subjugating their identity in a quest 
for standardisation, thereby, engendering an incompatibility between academics’ real 
emotions and that desired by universities. Webber (2006) claims that SET act as a form of 
surveillance for how feminist pedagogies are enacted by faculty members. Elsewhere, it has 
been suggested that surveillance increases the instrumentalisation of working practices to the 
extent that academic performance is constantly observed and evaluated (Worthington and 
Hodgson 2005; Craig, Amernic, and Tourish 2014). There have even been suggestions that 
academics now work in a context of normalised surveillance that constantly marks them as 
successes or failures (Lorenz 2012; Craig, Amernic, and Tourish 2014).  
Furthermore, while previous research examines academic resistance to SET, there is an 
absence of research exploring the academic response to the surveillance emerging from SET. 
This paper therefore analyses SET through the rubric of surveillance to offer new insight into 
the effect surveillance has on levels of control and trust, staff relations, and the way in which 
surveillance influences social change through the working practices embedded in institutional 
practices (Ball 2010). The aim of the paper is to identify and examine whether surveillance 
emerges from SET, the nature of the surveillance should it emerge, and how academics resist 
its effects. The paper begins with a discussion of surveillance and resistance. The 
methodology section outlines the rationale for a qualitative analysis of four university 
business schools. The findings are then presented and discussed. The paper concludes by 




Employees often expect managers to use performance management tools to have their 
performance reviewed, objectives set, and activities monitored and measured (Ball 2010; 
Marx 1999). Employees may even perceive performance management as a legitimate and 
impartial tool serving the interests of everyone in the organisation if it informs decisions 
around rewards and promotions whilst also exposing antisocial issues like free-riding or 
favouritism (Sewell, Barker, and Nyberg 2011). Not all performance management systems 
give rise to surveillance. However, surveillance emerges from performance management 
systems when managers in positions of authority do not trust employees to achieve 
performance expectations (Marx 1999; Sewell 2012; Zureike 2003). Unlike performance 
management, surveillance more narrowly refers to an intrusive and oppressive practice 
imposed on employees by managers to serve a narrow set of organisational interests 
concerned with intensifying work and reducing autonomy (Sewell, Barker, and Nyberg 
2011). Such distrust encourages management to use information technologies that 
automatically generate the performance information needed to deconstruct employees so they 
can be constantly scrutinised and controlled (Zureike 2003). This intensifies the collection of 
performance information and negatively compromises levels of control, autonomy, and trust 
(Ball 2010). The principal purpose of surveillance is not to protect against antisocial 
behaviour, but to ensure that employees constantly work as hard as they possibly can (Ball 
2010; Marx 1999; Sewell, Barker, and Nyberg 2011). This increases the feeling that 
organisations measure everything that moves and raises socio-theoretical concerns about the 
dystopian characteristics of power, politics, and resistance (Ball 2010; Sewell, Barker, and 
Nyberg 2011; Marx 1999). 
According to Sewell, Barker, and Nyberg (2011), surveillance enables managers to 
identify those employees who fail to ‘measure up’ to organisational expectations and values. 
Managers use surveillance to categorise individual employees as either satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory performers and to determine whether their status is ‘deviant’, ‘normal’ or 
‘useful’. They observe that when surveillance is rendered, managers believe they are 
asserting their right to scrutinise employees to ensure that organisational expectations are 
achieved. Employees therefore find themselves subjected to a managerial gaze that constantly 
tracks and records their performance (Ball 2010). Under these circumstances, however, 
employees may fight a ‘battle to assert their autonomy against this unwelcome intrusion’ such 
that they derive experiences of surveillance as a form of excessive performance management 
(Sewell, Barker, and Nyberg 2011). 
Central to the notion of surveillance is that employees subjected to it will enact the 
behaviours of those watching them whilst conforming to the organisational values embedded 
within the gaze (Iedema and Rhodes 2010). This draws upon the principles of the panopticon 
conceived by Jeremy Bentham and later extended by Michel Foucault (1977). The 
panopticon is premised on the principle that a few managers observe many employees who 
know they could be observed at any given time but do not know the precise moment they are 
being observed. These observations are coupled with disciplinary punishments, forcing 
employees to assume responsibility for their behaviour by internalising the gaze through a 
power relation in which they are the principle of their own subjection. This renders 
management superfluous and establishes a disciplinary form of surveillance maintained by 
employees through an asymmetrical power relation. 
Despite its influence on the field of surveillance, the panopticon has been criticised for 
excluding aspects of surveillance that fall outside of its framework (Lyon 2006). Vertical 
surveillance is embedded within hierarchical power relations concerned with comparing 
individual performance against organisational expectations (Sewell 2012, 1998). It involves a 
supervisor in a position of authority using information technologies to classify the 
performance of subordinates as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Sewell 2012). While this top-down form of 
vertical surveillance is most common, there is also a bottom-up form of vertical surveillance, 
involving subordinates observing managers (Sewell 2012). Another form of surveillance 
involves inspectors enrolling others to observe employees on their behalf. This occurs when 
employees find themselves subjected to the scrutiny of mystery shoppers who are employed 
by managers to measure customer satisfaction (Domenico and Ball 2010; Wilson 1998). The 
surveillance emerging from mystery shopping is covert if employees are not informed that 
they are observed by mystery shoppers. If employees are told they are observed then it is 
overt, but it is simultaneously covert as employees do not know who a genuine customer is. 
 
Resistance 
Despite management’s attempts to engender surveillance, there are always blind spots where 
individuals can resist its effects (Sewell 1998). According to Ball (2010), studies examining 
resistance to surveillance tend to draw upon labour theory arguments about the oppressive 
nature of control as well as Foucauldian arguments about the totalising desire of institutions 
to outflank resistance. Sewell’s (1998) examination of labour theory highlights how the 
control of work is the principal mechanism by which labour is subordinated by management. 
He identifies scientific management (Taylorism) as the most significant innovation in the 
pursuit of labour control, as it not only seeks to identify the best way to work, but also how 
best to control labour that might resist management. Sewell also examines Foucault’s 
contribution to labour theory by revealing how the panopticon is used by management to 
capture knowledge of employee performance under a totalising instrumental rationalism that 
marginalises dissent and resistance. In this context, resistance is conceptualised as a struggle 
against the labour process to prevent or minimise managerial encroachments by challenging 
or disrupting their assumptions, discourses, and power relations in increasingly pervasive 
organisational contexts (Mumby, Thomas, and Martí 2017). It manifests when employees 
assert their autonomy through individual and collective behaviours because they are 
dissatisfied with the intensification of their jobs and the detrimental effect it has on their 
wellbeing. 
Previous research examining academic resistance to SET draws upon these labour theory 
arguments of control. Siguaw and Simpson (2000) observe how academics perceive SET as 
problematic and therefore attempt to overcome them by lowering standards to appease 
students. They also show how academics introduce inducements to influence student ratings. 
Iqbal (2013) found that SET rarely fulfil their objectives because of a lack of engagement in 
the process by academics. Martin (1998) reveals how academics game student ratings in their 
favour by using practices that distract from learning rather than enhancing learning. Risquez, 
Vaughan, and Murphy (2015) found that while many academics appreciated the efficiency of 
online SET over paper-based SET, the lower student response rates experienced with the 
online system created a level of non-engagement by academics. Elsewhere, Wentworth, 
Behson, and Kelley’s (2018) examination of the implementation of a new SET highlights 
how some academics resisted change efforts by delaying communications. 
While extant research examines resistance to SET using traditional labour theory 
arguments, there is an absence of research analysing resistance to the surveillance emerging 
from SET. According to Ball (2010), when examined through the rubric of surveillance, 
resistance occurs when there is a break in the technology-mediated relationship between the 
observer and the observed. This involves employees circumventing surveillance by resisting 
the extraction of information to elude control. Breaking the flow of information enables 
employees to silence themselves by not giving out the valuable information management 
need to exercise control. Marx (2003) claims that surveillance can also be resisted through 
distorting moves, which involves employees manipulating the collection of performance 
information such that technically valid results are offered, but invalid inferences are drawn. 
He also highlights how employees can resist surveillance by preventing the extraction of 
performance information by refusing to do what is expected of them. This may involve an 
employee ignoring an authority or ‘just saying no’ to their request. 
 
Context 
Performance management became a concern for UK universities with the widespread 
adoption of New Public Management and, in particular, with the changes proposed by the 
Jarratt Committee in 1985 (Franco-Santos, Rivera, and Bourne 2014). In line with the New 
Public Management movement, the committee proposed that universities redirect their 
strategies to focus on performance management practices, emphasising quantitative 
performance indicators, the accountability of results, and staff appraisals. Alongside these 
changes, external organisations were introduced to evaluate teaching quality in higher 
education institutions. The Quality Assurance Agency was formed in 1997 to conduct quality 
assessment reviews to determine whether universities maintain academic standards. In 2017 
the Teaching Excellence Framework was introduced to provide standardised measures of 
teaching quality. This was followed by the Office for Students in 2018, which holds 
universities accountable for teaching quality. While these changes do not require universities 
to implement SET, many have developed SET to measure student satisfaction with teaching. 
 
Method 
A qualitative analysis of four UK university business schools was undertaken to elucidate the 
surveillance emerging from the performance management practices embedded in SET. 
Recruitment targeted a heterogeneous sample of academics working at universities in the UK. 
Four universities agreed to participate in the study. Two of the universities are classified as a 
post-1992 (new) universities and the other two are classified as a pre-1992 (old) universities. 
The universities and participants in this study are given anonymity to protect their identity. 
The two new universities are referred to as University Alpha and University Beta. The two 
old universities are referred to as University Omicron and University Omega. 
The research utilised semi-structured interviews (Rubin and Rubin 2012) and document 
analysis. The documents included: annual reports, customer service strategies, disciplinary 
procedures, education strategies, human resource policies, IT strategies, student evaluation 
strategies, and performance management reports. These public documents were analysed 
prior to the interviews to provide insight into the context of the four universities. 
A total of 34 interviews were conducted. There were 19 female participants and 15 male 
participants aged between 26 and 68 with a range of teaching and research experiences. 
Participants included managers: heads of department, deputy heads of department, and 
principal lecturers (new universities only). Participants also included academics: professors, 
senior lecturers, and lecturers. To be included in the study, participants had to have worked at 
their current university for at least one academic year. 
An interview protocol was designed around the different perspectives presented in the 
literature to ensure that the researchers did not drive an agenda that sought to show that 
surveillance emerges from SET (Gibbs 2007). Designing the interview protocol in this way 
allowed for a detailed exploration of the different views on SET: the claim that they can 
engender teaching benefits as well as the claim that they render surveillance. Participants 
worked in different academic departments to yield multiple perspectives. Eleven interviews 
were undertaken at University Alpha; eight at University Beta; seven at University Omicron; 
and eight at University Omega. Interviews took place in rooms on campus and were recorded 
for analysis. Participants were briefed about ethical considerations and invited to ask 
questions before the interviews started. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. 
Interview comments were restated and discussed to enhance credibility through respondent 
validation (Creswell 2013). Participants were invited to add any additional comments at the 
end of each interview. 
The interviews were analysed using thematic analysis to identify and interpret patterns in 
the data (Braun and Clarke 2006). The analysis involved the researchers analysing the data 
during the data collection process to identify interesting areas to pursue as they emerged 
(Gibbs 2007). This served as a member checking, confirmation and revision mechanism 
through which construct validity was established, supporting and illuminating the 
interpretation of the data (Creswell 2013). Each researcher independently analysed the data to 
become familiar with it (Braun and Clarke 2006). The researchers then discussed their 
findings to identify themes and to ensure one researcher did not dominate the theoretical 
horizon (Gibbs 2007). The interview data were related to the literature to enhance the 
reliability of the analysis, enabling the researchers to build valid arguments for choosing 
themes (Creswell 2013). Relevant data were collated into themes and they were then defined 
and named. This iterative process enabled the identification of nuanced themes that were 
corroborated or adjusted to add depth and texture to the analysis. Two themes emerged from 
the analysis: surveillance and resistance. 
 
Findings and discussion 
Surveillance 
The value all four universities place on student opinion is enshrined in their internal 
documentation: ‘Listening to the student voice is a priority for us. The student survey helps 
us to improve the academic experience for current and future students by giving them an 
opportunity to share their opinions, so that any necessary improvements can be made’ 
(Corporate Strategy, University Omicron). Similarly, the Customer Service Strategy at 
University Beta states: ‘Students are crucial as they provide valuable feedback enabling us to 
maintain and improve the quality of our teaching services. Evaluating student opinion and 
responding to their views is a key indicator for the assurance and enhancement of service 
quality.’ All four of the business schools evaluate student opinion through SET made 
available to students through online surveys at fixed points throughout the academic year. 
Academics are emailed telling them to promote student participation in SET and students are 
encouraged to complete SET through emails sent to their university account. The SET ask 
students to assess each module and programme using a Likert scale. The questions vary 
between the four business schools, but common questions include: How satisfied are you 
with this module? How satisfied are you with the teaching on this module? How satisfied are 
you with the online resources for this module? How satisfied are you with the availability of 
your tutor? How satisfied are you with the programme? The SET also allow students to write 
qualitative comments. The results are made available through a spreadsheet or dashboard, 
showing student response rates and satisfaction scores for each question. 
Information technologies provide a crucial element of the infrastructure underpinning 
SET, as they automatically transform student feedback into performance information that 
reduces each academic to a Likert score. This engenders a disembodied gaze that frees 
managers from the architecture of the workplace by enabling them to scrutinise and control 
each academic without a direct line of sight into the classroom (Sewell 2012; Zureike 2003). 
This reductionist approach to performance management dehumanises academics by defining 
them as performance instruments judged by performance results alone. Standardising 
performance information in this way has seen performance targets embedded in teaching 
practices throughout the four business schools. Employment contracts do not specify the 
performance targets academics must achieve. However, they are enshrined in publicly 
available university documents: ‘We need to know if our services meet customer 
expectations. We will actively collect customer feedback and use it to improve our services. 
We aim to achieve student satisfaction scores of mean 4.0 and above’ (Student Evaluation 
Strategy, University Omega). Managers throughout the four business schools outlined the 
strict performance targets academics are expected to achieve: 
 
I can see the score and compare each module during the different terms to see how they’re 
progressing throughout the year. If there are any low scoring modules, I can see which I 
need to focus on… We aim for a 6 [out of 7 which is a university determined target], but 
if a module scores less than five and a half then I’ll need to look at it and take remedial 
action. That’s when I’ll talk to the module leader to discuss the content and how it’s 
delivered. (Head of Department, University Omicron) 
 
Modules are expected to hit 4 out of 5, but I tell staff to aim high with 4.2. If it’s below 
3.6 I’ll have a chat with the teaching team… I aim high because I don’t want to be called 
to a meeting with the Dean to explain why we underperformed. (Principal Lecturer, 
University Beta) 
 
The comments above indicate that SET are not only dependent on information 
technologies that automatically collate performance information, they also involve a social 
process that depends on managers intervening where necessary to regulate and control 
academic behaviour. Managers believe the ability to evaluate and control academics in this 
way is important to ensure university expectations are achieved (Blackmore 2009; Bedggood 
and Donovan 2012). However, academics across the four business schools expressed a sense 
of frustration about the performance targets to the extent that they perceive them as a form of 
excessive performance management: 
 
You’re always worried about the feedback because if you get less than 4 out of 5, you’re 
not compliant… I got 3.5 on an undergraduate module, so I got an email from [the deputy 
head of department] inviting me to a meeting to discuss my performance. It was really 
stressful. (Senior Lecturer, University Alpha) 
 
I was on the naughty step because my module got 3.9 when [management’s] expecting 4 
out of 5. The targets are absurd. Why should I be accountable to students when some of 
them haven’t even attended half the lectures? (Lecturer, University Omega) 
 
These findings reveal that while these performance targets are designed to ensure teaching 
expectations are achieved, academics resent the intensification of performance management 
as it extends management control, increases levels of stress, and negatively affect levels of 
trust: 
 
It’s not a collegiate environment where they trust you to develop your teaching. Why else 
would management monitor everything that you do? (Professor, University Omega) 
 
The student survey has really intensified in recent years... It’s a really stressful 
environment… It doesn’t feel like management trust me to do what I’m paid to do. 
(Senior Lecturer, University Omicron).  
 
Despite resenting the intensification of performance management, a benefit of using SET 
was outlined by a Lecturer at University Omega: ‘The [student] survey means I don’t need to 
bother seeing the Programme Leader to discuss how things can be improved: I can see for 
myself on the dashboard’. Such responses were extremely limited across the four business 
schools. For most academics, the benefits of SET are outweighed by the view that they 
increase feelings of mistrust and extend management control. Academics are justified in their 
claim that management do not trust them to achieve teaching expectations, as many managers 
confirmed the distrust they have for academics: 
 
I use the performance information from the [student] survey to check whether staff are 
performing as expected. Without the feedback we’ve got no way of measuring whether 
staff are doing what they’re supposed to… I use [the performance] information to keep 
things in check and, if necessary, I’ll take corrective action. (Head of Department, 
University Omega) 
 
We can’t just let [academics] get on with teaching without knowing what they’re doing or 
how it’s going. That’s why we need the student survey. (Principal Lecturer, University 
Beta) 
 
These findings support the claim that surveillance emerges from performance 
management systems because employees are not trusted to achieve performance expectations 
(Marx 1999; Sewell 2012; Zureike 2003; Ball 2010). This lack of trust and the strict 
performance targets result in academics being subjected to the constant gaze of students as 
well as the ever-watchful gaze of management: 
 
It’s like having a food critic in your restaurant every single day judging you on every 
single meal you ever make… The [IT] system automatically produces reports for 
management so there’s no escape. You’re constantly judged by students and management. 
(Senior Lecturer, University Beta) 
 
We get feedback from hundreds of students on the larger modules… Being monitored by 
so many students and then being checked by management creates an unbelievable amount 
of pressure. Some people can take it on the chin, but for many people, myself included, it 
gives you sleepless nights. (Lecturer, University Alpha).  
 
I’ve got students evaluating me during every single lecture and during every single 
seminar. Then I get it from my head of department at the end of every term. It never 
ends... You feel like you’re slowly being suffocated. (Senior Lecturer, University Omega) 
 
It’s management who want to get into the classroom with us and judge our teaching. The 
observations students make and then feedback through the student survey are gospel 
because [management] use it to keep an eye on your performance. (Senior Lecturer, 
University Beta) 
 
Management’s observations are rooted in what academics perceive as excessive 
performance management infused with feelings of mistrust, engendering a form of top-down 
vertical surveillance embedded in the hierarchical power relations in the four business 
schools (Sewell 2012; Ball 2010). It involves managers using the performance information 
derived from SET to pervade the working lives of academics to measure and categorise them 
into distinct categories: those who achieve performance expectations and those who do not. 
Managers believe this top-down vertical scrutiny is necessary, as it supports their right to 
constantly extract maximum effort from academics by forcing them to comply with 
management-imposed performance expectations (Sewell, Barker, and Nyberg 2011). This 
intrusive form of surveillance is imposed on academics and serves a narrow set of managerial 
interests concerned with intensifying work and reducing autonomy. The surveillance 
therefore perpetuates management’s position in formal hierarchical power structures with 
little such benefit conferred on academics. 
Alongside this top-down vertical surveillance, the findings also reveal a form of bottom-
up vertical surveillance. This involves academics inverting the gaze and using the 
performance information derived from SET to observe and evaluate how managers perform. 
This reverses formal hierarchical power structures, allowing subordinates to hold managers to 
the same performance standards imposed on them whilst also enabling them to scrutinise and 
categorise managers as either satisfactory or unsatisfactory: 
 
Last year there were a few complaints about the lecture theatre. The room wasn’t 
conducive to a lecture for the numbers, and the students made that very clear on the 
[student] survey… Room bookings are down to management, so I had a meeting with [my 
deputy head of department] about the feedback. I made it clear that she needed to address 
the problem… I had to chase her up about it a few weeks later because she hadn’t done 
anything about it. (Lecturer, University Alpha) 
 
These two forms of vertical surveillance (top-down and bottom-up) involve managers and 
academics evaluating each other’s performance to ensure conformance with university 
expectations (Sewell 1998). However, the vertical surveillance emerging from SET goes 
beyond extant notions of managers and employees observing and evaluating each other, as 
students also play a crucial role in the vertical surveillance. The top-down surveillance in the 
four business schools involves a few managers scrutinising many academics through the 
observations of many students, whilst the bottom-up surveillance involves many academics 
scrutinising a few managers through the observations of many students. This has implications 
for students as they are transformed into surveillance instruments that have no formal power, 
but nevertheless form a crucial component in the surveillance, as it collapses without their 
participation. This differs significantly from extant notions of vertical surveillance, as it is 
dependent on others generating the required performance information. 
The role students play in this surveillance is further highlighted when analysed within the 
context of mystery shopping. Like mystery shoppers, students are enrolled by universities to 
provide feedback on academic performance. However, the findings reveal three differences 
between the surveillance emerging from mystery shopping and the surveillance emerging 
from SET. First, students are not employed or paid by managers to observe and evaluate 
academics. Instead, universities encourage student participation by framing it as 
strengthening and empowering the student voice. Second, while mystery shoppers evaluate 
some employee interactions (Wilson 1998), students can observe academics during every 
single class throughout the entire academic year. This creates a pervasive gaze that constantly 
scrutinises academics whilst fuelling feelings of mistrust between academics, managers, and 
students. Finally, while mystery shoppers undertake covert observations and make every 
effort to mask their role (Domenico and Ball 2010; Ball 2010), there is no deception with 
students observing academic performance: academics know students are observing and 
evaluating their performance. Students also know that academics are aware of them 
observing and evaluating their performance. This creates an overt gaze as academics know 
they are observed by students and then scrutinised by the ‘all-embracing’ surveillant gaze of 
management (Domenico and Ball 2010). However, the gaze is also covert, as academics do 
not know which students will participate in the evaluation of their performance. 
SET have significant implications for academic identities. Academics in all four business 
schools outlined how the surveillance enables students to influence the design of teaching: 
‘Students don’t like exams, so they don’t do exams. Students don’t like the delivery method, 
so it gets changed. Student satisfaction comes first so we have to do what they want to keep 
them happy’ (Senior Lecturer, University Alpha). The knowledge and expertise of 
professional educators is therefore compromised, as student opinion is given primacy when 
developing teaching. This reinforces the Foucauldian view that surveillance reengineers the 
professional identity of academics to ensure they conform to university standards determined 
by those in positions of power (Worthington and Hodgson 2005). It also supports the claim 
that management use SET to drive student-focused emotional labour, putting academics 
under pressure to conform to student feedback whilst subjugating their professional identity 
in a quest for standardisation (Ogbonna and Harris 2004). This adds to the claim that 
academics work in a context of normalised surveillance (Lorenz 2012; Craig, Amernic, and 
Tourish 2014), and highlights the ongoing sense of mistrust that management have for 
academics in their role as professional educators. 
The multidirectional and multilayered surveillance emerging from SET is intensified 
because academics are subjected to disciplinary punishments for failing to achieve 
performance expectations. Disciplinary procedures are outlined in human resource policies to 
ensure processes are in place to identify and correct academics who fail to achieve 
performance expectations. Managers and academics outlined their severity: 
 
There’s someone in the department who’s scored low on the [student] survey for a few 
years. She’s got to be careful because this year she’s going through an official 
performance review and, if she doesn’t do well, she’s going to be performance managed 
out. (Principal Lecturer, University Alpha) 
 
A colleague of mine has scored low on several modules and he’s been identified as a 
weak link in the chain. He’s got to be careful because he might find himself out of here. 
(Lecturer, University Omega) 
 
[A colleague] recently lost her job because her new head of department didn’t think she 
was performing… The worrying thing is that [the head of department’s] decision was 
informed by the student survey. (Senior Lecturer, University Beta) 
 
These disciplinary punishments are embedded in the gaze to ensure academics conform to 
university expectations. The threat of punishment embeds a power relation in the gaze 
designed to control the performance of academics. This forms part of the organisational 
compulsion to rationalise and control individuals to fully integrate them into university life 
(Sewell 2012). The surveillance emerging from SET therefore confers massive benefits on 
the employer, but relatively little benefit on academics, as there are no formal procedures to 
reward them for exceeding performance expectations. The findings also differ from previous 
studies claiming that research informs decisions around retention and promotion (Cadez, 
Dimovski, and Groff 2017), by revealing that teaching also influences decisions around 
retention but not promotion. 
Academics also revealed that if they are identified as underperformers, they receive little 
to no support or training: 
 
Training? What training? It’s bullshit. The so-called training covers things like diversity, 
data protection, and the admin side of teaching, but not the practicalities of delivering a 
seminar… We have peer observations, but you might get paired with someone who gets 
weak or average feedback… There’s no one to support you with teaching, but there’ll 
always be someone to tell you that you’re not on target. (Lecturer, University Alpha). 
 
This lack of support heightens academic feelings of performance anxiety and exacerbates 
feelings of mistrust towards management. These findings also contradict university policies 
outlining the importance of ‘investing in staff development so they have the skills and 
knowledge to excel in their jobs’ (Organisational Strategy, University Alpha) as well as 
claims that universities are ‘providing continuing professional development opportunities for 
professional colleagues involved in supporting the student learning experience’ (Staff 
Development Report, University Omega). This suggests that while universities describe staff 
development as an important university value to support the student learning experience, the 
performance information derived from SET is used primarily to identify and discipline 
underperforming academics. This has implications for students, as academics are not 
provided with development opportunities to enhance the student learning experience. 
 
Resistance 
Despite the surveillance emerging from SET, there are academics who resist its effects. 
Academics play a crucial role in the production of the performance information underpinning 
the surveillance, as management require them to promote SET to students. The sample size 
managers use to observe and evaluate academic performance is therefore influenced by 
academics participating in the promotion of SET. Academics recognise the value the 
performance information underpinning the surveillance has to management, and that 
disrupting its production will enable them to evade management control. As a result, 
academics often refuse to promote SET to reduce the reliability of the sample size. This 
creates a gap in the surveillance and limits management’s ability to determine whether 
academics need subjecting to disciplinary procedures: 
 
We get bombarded by emails from management telling us to push the student survey, but I 
never do. Last year just one student completed the [student] survey for a postgraduate 
module I run... Management left me alone because they couldn’t gauge what was going 
on from just one response. (Senior Lecturer, University Alpha) 
 
I never tell students to complete the [student] survey because it’s more trouble than it’s 
worth… You’re just adding fuel to the fire. The more students who complete the survey 
the more headaches you’ll get… The less [performance] data management get the better. 
(Senior Lecturer, University Omicron) 
 
I don’t bother promoting the [student] survey because it gives management access to 
[performance] information that they might end up using against you. The last thing I need 
is a meeting with [my head of department] because I haven’t hit my targets. (Lecturer, 
University Beta) 
 
Other academics resist the surveillance through distorting moves. These distorting moves 
reveal how academics consider the student response to SET and attempt to manipulate the 
outcome of the surveillance by introducing bias into student opinion. While these acts of 
resistance still yield technically valid results, managers draw invalid inferences from their 
observations thereby reducing the chances of academics being subjected to disciplinary 
punishments (Marx 2003): 
 
It’s simple: if student don’t do well on their assignment, they’ll just score you down on 
the student survey. Then management will be on your back and you could end up in their 
office having an uncomfortable conversation. So, where’s the motivation for me to sell 
the [student] survey? (Professor, University Beta) 
 
I never give [assessment] results when the student survey is available because they’ll only 
mark you down if they’re not happy with their mark. (Senior Lecturer, University Alpha) 
 
I don’t give students additional work or reading when they’re asked to complete the 
[student] survey. It’ll just lower my module’s score. (Lecturer, University Omicron) 
 
The first two comments show how some academics do not return assessment grades to 
students at the same time SET are made available. These academics believe that if students 
score poorly on their assessment, they will score the module down and that they could then 
end up being subjected to disciplinary procedures. Unlike the leniency hypothesis, which 
posits that academics can ‘buy’ higher SET results by awarding higher grades (Marsh 1984), 
in the four business schools, academics are more concerned with poor performing students 
who could score their module low rather than strong performing students who could score it 
high. The third comment shows how some academics carefully time when they increase the 
student workload because they are concerned with students scoring their module down should 
they believe they have too much work (Marsh 1984). The wider organisational effect of this 
resistance is that it encourages academics to focus on a narrow range of measurable 
performance outcomes to minimise contentious readings. It also favours style over substance 
to produce thin pedagogies which undermine student learning (Blackmore 2009). 
These findings reveal that although surveillance is supposed to make such acts of 
resistance futile (Sewell 1998), academics can resist its effects to evade its rationalising 
nature. However, despite these acts of resistance, management expressed no intention of 
changing how they use SET, as they believe they are asserting their right to scrutinise 
academic performance (Sewell, Barker, and Nyberg 2011). These acts of resistance have 
therefore done little to alter university regimes, as management continue using SET to 
perpetuate power relations to their benefit whilst disproportionately applying them to 
academics further down the hierarchy. 
 
Conclusions 
Although previous research suggests surveillance emerges from SET, the debate is here 
extended by drawing on surveillance theory to identify and elucidate the nature of the 
surveillance emerging from SET as well as the academic response to the surveillance. A top-
down vertical surveillance imbued with disciplinary procedures is identified, involving a few 
managers scrutinising many academics through the observations of many students. A bottom-
up vertical surveillance is also identified, involving many academics scrutinising a few 
managers through the observations of many students. The similarities and differences 
between mystery shopping and the surveillance emerging from SET were also examined to 
reveal the essential role students play in the surveillance. Finally, although previous research 
draws upon labour theory to examine academic resistance to SET, new insights are offered 
into the resistance strategies academics employ to disrupt the flow of performance 
information between observer and observed. 
With university managers continuing to use SET to collect performance information, 
there is a need for clarity in terms of what is being measured and how it is being measured. 
Future research could therefore examine what performance information should be collected 
and how it should be analysed to reduce surveillance, enhance performance management, and 
improve levels of trust. However, such research should tread carefully. Producing more 
performance information could have the opposite effect and further intensify surveillance by 
extending management’s gaze (Ball 2010). Finally, while this research offers insight into SET 
in four business schools, it cannot claim whether the emerging surveillance is unique to 
business schools or whether it also occurs in different faculties. Future research could 
therefore examine whether surveillance emerges from SET in different faculties, the 
conditions giving rise to it, and whether it differs from that in business schools. 
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